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Introduction: the King’s Routine 
 
Studies of embodied intelligence have often tended to focus on the essentially 
responsive aspects of bodily expertise (for example, catching a ball once it has been hit into the 
air). But skilled sportsmen and sportswomen, actors and actresses, dancers, orators, and other 
performers often execute ritual-like gestures or other fixed action routines as performance-
optimizing elements in their pre-performance preparations, especially when daunting or 
unfamiliar conditions are anticipated. For example, a recent movie (The King’s Speech) and a 
book of memories (Logue and Conradi, 2010) have revealed that, just before broadcasting his 
historic announcement that the United Kingdom was entering the Second World War, King 
George VI furiously repeated certain tongue twisters in a resolute effort to overcome his 
relentless stutter. Such ritualized actions don‟t merely change the causal relations between 
performers and their physical environments (although this may well be part of their function); 
they provide performers with the practical scaffolds that summon more favourable contexts for 
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their accomplishments, by uncovering viable landscapes for effective action rather than 
unassailable barricades of frightening obstacles. In other words, while the kinds of embodied 
skills that have occupied many recent theorists serve to attune behaviour to an actual context of 
activity, whether that context is favourable or not, preparatory embodied routines actively refer 
to certain potential (and thus non-actual) contexts of a favourable nature that those routines 
themselves help to bring about, indicating the possibilities of actions disclosed by the desired 
context. As we shall see, this sort of transformative event, which is exemplified by, but not 
confined to, the ritualized gestures and routines of skilled performers, is a regular occurrence in 
everyday skilled activity, not the crowning achievement of a few talented individuals; so the 
capacity in question belongs centrally to our ordinary suite of bodily skills. The theoretical 
ramifications of that embodied capacity are the topic of this paper. 
 
Our ability to skillfully indicate and reconfigure contexts is intimately intertwined with the 
widely cited, but (we think) incompletely understood, phenomenon of the background. Following 
others, we take the background to be the implicit and plausibly endless chains of preconditions 
(bodily, attitudinal, social, cultural) that provide the context-dependent meaning and normative 
relevance conditions for any specific intelligent action. Consider, for example, the innumerable 
preconditions of this kind which are in play when an intelligent being walks into a BBC studio 
and recognizes it as the uncanny setting of an historically momentous, personally challenging, 
public speech. Our remarkable capacity to navigate the open-ended and shifting structure of a 
human life by way of the background is what Dreyfus (2008) calls „background coping’ or 
„ground-level intelligence’. In what follows, we shall argue that the defiantly nonrepresentational 
conception of ground-level intelligence developed and defended by Dreyfus himself, and by 
others who share his general approach, is ultimately unable to do justice to the distinctive 
dynamics of background, precisely because that conception, at least partly as a consequence of 
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its representation-shunning character, fails to encompass the particular, transformative, 
background-involving embodied capacity so strikingly illustrated by the King‟s routine.  
 
 
1. Absorbed Coping, the Background, and the Problem of Relevance 
 
According to one generic, orthodox view, traditionally dominant in areas such as 
cognitive science and artificial intelligence (AI), intelligent behaviour is internally mediated, in 
multiple and varied ways, by models of the world, specifications of pregiven goal-states, and/or 
problem-solving procedures based on stored rules and heuristics. This theoretical package – 
call it cognitivism – is no longer mandatory, even in cognitive-scientific circles. One source of 
disquiet comes from a philosophical approach to intelligence that, in the hands of some thinkers, 
has recently and controversially been converted from a hostile brake on the ambitions of 
cognitive science into an emerging alternative conceptual framework within which cognitive 
science might be developed. (For some of the details of this transformation, see for instance 
Kiverstein, forthcoming; Wheeler and Di Paolo, forthcoming.) First advanced by Dreyfus (for 
example, 1992, 2002a, 2002b), and then in various forms by, for example, Kelly (2000, 2002), 
Rietveld (2008, forthcoming) and Wheeler (2005, 2008, 2010; Cappuccio and Wheeler, 2010), 
the approach in question draws its inspiration from phenomenological thinkers such as 
Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty. In its most prominent form (to be placed under scrutiny here), 
the view takes everyday intelligent activity to be most revealingly characterized by a mode of 
engagement with environmental entities that Dreyfus (2002a) has dubbed „absorbed coping’, 
understood as the skillful and fluid adjustment of behaviour to context-dependent contingencies 
by way of a richly adaptive, direct (that is, unmediated by representations or any subject-object 




The notion of absorbed coping will be important in what follows, so it is worth pausing 
here to unpack it a little. The behaviour of an absorbed, coping agent, motivated to achieve his 
practical goals, is not regulated by any set of truth conditions attached to a pre-specified goal-
state (that is, a description of the state of affairs in which a belief that some goal-state obtains 
would be true; cf. means-end analysis AI algorithms that produce plans for reducing the 
difference between the current state of the world and some explicitly represented goal-state). 
Rather, the behaviour of an absorbed, coping agent is regulated by that agent‟s capacity to 
sense intensities of deviations from a contextually determined optimal balance with her 
environment, coupled with her instinctive practical knowledge of how to adjust her behaviour to 
improve her performance and thus reduce her sense of being out of balance. With absorbed 
coping identified as a kind of zone of expert performance, skill acquisition and direct 
sensitiveness to contextual relevance may be seen as developing together and as implicating 
each other, since coming to have a mature performative competence for a certain action means 
becoming able to recognize what situations afford it appropriately, and distinguishing the fine-
grained articulation of a situation means knowing how to navigate it competently (Dreyfus, 
2002a). 
 
One might articulate this picture further by identifying the absorbed coper‟s direct 
sensitivity to relevance – his unmediated sense of being in or out of balance with her 
environment – as indicating the property of thrownness (Heidegger, 1996). As thrown, the 
absorbed coper always finds himself in a world that matters to him in some way or another. This 
always-already-meaningful world into which he is thrown is encountered fundamentally in terms 
of practical dispositions towards context-dependent affordances (possibilities for action 
presented by the environment). But, crucially, the contentful structure (or significance) of this 
world is neither fully articulated within the practical knowledge that enables the coper to 
negotiate situations, nor is it fully articulable in some ideal theoretical register. This is because 
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that structure encompasses a vast and indeterminate web of implicit preconditions for sense 
making, “an unexplicated horizon” or background, providing “the vantage point from out of 
which” every experience matters to one in certain way (Taylor 1993, p. 325). As we shall 
understand this horizonal background, it contains every interwoven element of our adaptive 
know-how (whether bodily, attitudinal, social or cultural), that is presupposed by our concrete 
practical engagements. The background is thus itself a body of adaptive know-how, although 
one which is implicitly presupposed by, rather than on open display in, everyday patterns of 
skilled activity. This suggests that our epistemic relationship with the background (our familiarity 
with, and capacity to smoothly navigate, its unarticulated patterns of significance) is itself a kind 
of coping, hence Dreyfus‟s (2008) term background coping. Moreover, since the background is, 
in effect, a transcendental condition for absorbed coping, it constitutes a deep-structural feature 
of skilled expert performance; so background coping constitutes our ground-level intelligence 
(see again Dreyfus, 2008). 
 
If we view intelligent behaviour in the light of its thrownness, we can offer a compelling 
diagnosis of why cognitivist AI, as identified above, has struggled to provide any general 
solution to the so-called frame problem (for this claim, see Dreyfus 1992, 2008; for discussion, 
see Wheeler 2005). Here, the frame problem is to be interpreted in the widest possible sense, 
as the problem of building a naturalistically discharged system (for example, a computational 
machine) that can process information and produce behaviour in a manner that is fluidly and 
flexibly sensitive to context-dependent relevance. In this general form, the frame problem might 
simply be re-named the problem of relevance. Here is how the problem manifests itself. Faced 
with the challenge of determining which of its behaviour-generating rules and representations 
are relevant in the present context, the cognitivist agent might naturally deploy second-order 
rules and representations that determine first-order contextual relevance. But this strategy can 
succeed only in pushing the issue of relevance one stage back, for the system then needs to 
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decide which of its stored heuristics or potentially context-specifying representations are 
currently relevant, a challenge which requires a further, higher-order set of heuristics or 
representations, and so on. Put another way, to the extent that cognitivist AI persists in 
attempting to capture the background (the preconditions of our context-situated intelligence) in 
terms of explicit representations and rules, it runs headlong into an infinite regress of context-
specifying structures. Once we adopt the perspective of thrownness, however, the conditions 
that generate this sort of infinite regress are never established, because appropriate behaviour 
selection and modification are rooted in a nonrepresentational direct coupling between agent 
and environment which already embodies sufficient sensitivity to relevance. In particular, 
because the normative preconditions of an action are implicitly embedded in the context that the 
agent inhabits as a practical scenario – as features of that agent‟s background – they don‟t need 
to be scrutinized as aspects of a problem to be decoded and solved. 
 
At this point things get more complicated, for it seems to us that there are two different 
dimensions to the problem of relevance. First there is an intra-context problem, which 
challenges us to say how a naturalistically discharged system is able to achieve appropriate, 
flexible and fluid action within a context. Then there is an inter-context problem, which 
challenges us to say how a naturalistically discharged system is able to flexibly and fluidly 
switch between an open-ended sequence of contexts in a relevance-sensitive manner (Wheeler 
2008, 2010). If this distinction between an intra-context and an inter-context problem of 
relevance is indeed genuine (criticisms of the distinction will be considered later), an intriguing 
question suggests itself: are the nonrepresentational processes that we have met so far under 
the banner of Dreyfusian ground-level intelligence sufficient to account not only for our within-
context sensitivity to relevance, but also for our capacity for relevance-sensitive, open-ended 




2. Solicitation and Summoning 
If we add a little more detail to the picture of ground-level intelligence sketched so far, an 
affirmative answer to our question comes into view. The key here is an application of Merleau-
Ponty‟s (1962) notion of the intentional arc, according to which skills are not internally 
represented, but are realized as contextually situated solicitations by one‟s environment that 
tend to become more fine grained with experience (see Dreyfus 2008, 340). Thus, as Gallagher 
(2008) explains, when poised to engage in the action of climbing a mountain, the skilled climber 
does not build an inner representation of the mountain and infer from that plus additionally 
represented knowledge of her own abilities that it is climbable by her. Rather, from a certain 
distance, in particular visual conditions, the mountain „simply‟ looks climbable to her. Her 
climbing know-how is „sedimented‟ in how the mountain looks to her and thus may solicit the 
action of climbing from her. Clarifying this idea further, Rietveld (forthcoming) usefully draws a 
distinction between different kinds of affordance. Given a specific situation, some affordances 
are mere possibilities for action, where „mere‟ signals the fact that although the agent could 
respond to them in some way, such a response would be contextually inappropriate. In the 
same situation, however, some affordances, precisely because they are either directly 
contextually relevant to the task at hand, or have proved to be relevant in similar situations in 
the past, prime us for action and thus, as Rietveld (forthcoming) puts it, render us ready to act in 
appropriate ways by being bodily potentiating. It is affordances of the latter kind that are 
identified by Rietveld as Merleau-Pontian solicitations, divided into figure solicitations and 
ground solicitations. Figure solicitations are those with which we are actively concerned. Ground 
solicitations, by contrast, are those with which we are not currently concerned, but for which we 
are currently potentiated, and which are thus poised to summon us to act. (see Rietveld 
forthcoming). According to this phenomenological analysis, the background structures of ground 
solicitations, together with the process of summoning that those structures support, are the 




It is important to note that the distinction between figure and ground solicitations should 
be conceived not in terms of two fundamentally separate kinds of element governed by distinct 
proprietary mechanisms, but in terms of different perspectival depths within the same overall 
structure of significance. These perspectival depths correspond respectively to the proximal 
concerns of an occurrent practical context and the potential retrieval of relevant sense-making 
elements from an entire life and history (an immanent and finite condition of being-in-the-world; 
Heidegger 1996). In harmony with the idea that intelligent behaviour involves a complex but 
ultimately continuous landscape of varying perspectival depths, Dreyfus (2008) argues that it is 
at root the same practical, competent disposition to maintain a dynamical balance with 
contextual circumstances that underlies within-context absorbed coping and cross-contextual 
summoning, and that this competence is materially implemented at the subpersonal level by the 
same set of complex, dynamical, nonrepresentational structures and processes. To provide an 
example of such subpersonal structures and processes, Dreyfus calls on the neurodynamical 
framework developed by Freeman (2000), in which the brain is conceptualized as a 
nonrepresentational dynamical system primed by past experience to actively pick up and enrich 
significance. The constantly shifting attractor landscape of such a system physically grounds 
Merleau-Ponty‟s intentional arc, by causally explaining how newly encountered significances 
may interact with existing patterns of inner organization to create new global structures for 
interpreting and responding to stimuli. 
 
Taken to the limit, the line of thought that we have been laying out generates scepticism 
about the very distinction between intra-context and inter-context versions of the problem of 
relevance. Thus Rietveld (forthcoming) argues that sensitivity to within-context relevance 
essentially coincides with the broader sensitivity to global relevance that guides 
nonrepresentational background coping. If context-specific activity were genuinely encapsulated 
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(that is, if it relied only on segregated portions of the background), then our responses to local 
contingencies, even if successful, would be at constant risk of neglecting the background on 
which their broader appropriateness depends. Rietveld illustrates this risk by drawing an 
analogy between contextually encapsulated relevance-sensitivity and a neuropsychological 
pathology called „utilization behaviour‟. Patients with this disorder are excessively sensitive to 
the local affordances provided by the immediate environment, and suffer from an inability to 
discriminate between appropriate and inappropriate behavioural responses (Lhermitte, 1986, p. 
342). As a result, contextually inappropriate actions are not inhibited, even though broader 
background knowledge should discourage them. For example, a patient exhibiting utilization 
behaviour may start compulsively making the bed that he or she sees before her, even if this 
bed is in someone else‟s house. Rietveld imputes such behaviour to a disruption of the normal 
tendency to situate the local context of action within its holistic background, a tendency that he 
calls sensitivity to „real relevance‟. In his view, this impairment in sensitivity to real relevance 
reflects what would happen in normal subjects if context-specific activity were encapsulated. 
 
For Rietveld, then, ground-level intelligence underwrites a behavioural profile in which 
solicitation makes sense only where there is an intrinsic possibility of summoning. This, he 
concludes, destabilizes the distinction between intra-context and inter-context sensitivity to 
relevance. The point might be put like this: if the preconditions of all skills, including the most 
specialized ones, are part of an holistic, unrepresentable “background sense of reality […], 
something we possess in – that is inseparable from – our actual dealings with things” (Taylor, 
1993, p. 327), then arguably there is no precise boundary separating the context-specific forms 
of coping from background coping, but only local ways for the latter to be revealed within the 
former. To return to our opening example, the context-specific task of speaking on national radio 
wouldn‟t have been such a tremendous ordeal for George VI, if that task wasn‟t interpenetrated 
by a range of background conditions, including some excruciating personal circumstances, 
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institutional and familial expectations, the fact that he had recently become King in a very 
dramatic political contingency, and so on. 
 
Rietveld proceeds to deny the target distinction on additional, neurofunctional grounds. 
Here he targets previous work by Wheeler (2008, 2010), in which it is argued that the intra-
context problem of relevance may be neutralized by a sub-class of encapsulated mechanisms 
that he (Wheeler) calls special-purpose adaptive couplings (SPACs). The precise details of 
Wheeler‟s analysis and argument need not concern us here (although a little more detail is 
given below, during the discussion of Mataric‟s robot, Toto), but the general thought in play is 
that because SPACs become activated correctly only in the presence of the right, contextually 
relevant input, the intra-context problem of relevance never arises for them. Rietveld suggests 
that the best candidates for neural SPACs are certain context-specific installed routines present 
in the lateral premotor areas of the brain (routines that involve mirror neurons, canonical 
neurons, and other action-specific families of motor neurons). But, he observes, “preafference 
shows that the triggering of SPACs […] presupposes the proper functioning of the medial frontal 
system that determines the sensitivity of the sensory system” and “tunes it to respond to what is 
currently significant to the individual” (Rietveld, forthcoming, p. 23; cf. Dreyfus, 2008, p. 350). 
Importantly, this modulation of the system‟s sensitivity is something that normally happens 
before the stimulus is picked up. So the proper functioning of the premotor system that 
instantiates SPACs is dependent on the prior activity of the medial premotor system, the system 
that, according to Rietveld, orients the sensory expectations of the agent, tuning her general 
sensitivity to the overall context in which she is situated. Once again, then, the distinction 
between intra-context and inter-context sensitivity to relevance is placed under threat. 
 
We introduced this section by wondering whether the kind of nonrepresentational 
account of ground-level intelligence advocated by Dreyfus has the resources to account for all 
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forms of sensitivity to relevance. By now it may seem that a compelling affirmative answer has 
been given to that question, and that the boot has been transferred to the other foot. In other 
words, rather than worrying about the scope of the nonrepresentational account of background 
coping, it seems we should be asking whether it is possible for background coping ever to 
engage representations. So let‟s ask that question.   
 
3. Ground-Level Representations 
At this point we need to back up slightly. We wish to propose two principles pertaining to 
the nature of the background, principles that, we think, any adequate account of the background 
would need to respect. The first, strongly suggested by our foregoing discussion of Dreyfus and 
Rietveld, is what we shall call the principle of unity. This states that the background cannot be 
decomposed into self-sufficient, encapsulated parts without sacrificing the holism that 
characterizes its transcendence. The second is what we shall call the principle of mutuality. The 
justification for this principle comes from Merleau-Ponty‟s (1962, p. 159) pregnant observation 
that “movement and background are, in fact, only artificially separated stages of a unique 
totality”. We take this observation to imply that background coping and context-specific coping 
enjoy a background-foreground relationship (recall the discussion of different perspectival 
depths in a single landscape of significance; see also Cappuccio and Wheeler, 2010), but also, 
and crucially, that the relationship in question is one in which the two modes of coping, 
conceptualized (somewhat artificially, as Merleau-Ponty points out) as separate stages in the 
process of sense-making, are able to dynamically shape each other. The principles of unity and 
mutuality enable us to re-ask the question of whether or not there exist ground-level 
representations. The principle of unity suggests that background coping may discriminate 
between contexts by somehow representing the criteria for such discrimination, if and only if 
some contingent configurations of the background could act as representations of the 
background itself, without this implying a decomposition of the background into self-sufficient, 
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encapsulated parts. The principle of mutuality suggests that the nonrepresentationalist account 
of ground-level intelligence advocated by Dreyfus and Rietveld is unable to do justice to the 
complex and subtle dynamics of the background. It might seem as if this claim must be wrong, 
since it might seem that the Dreyfus-Rietveld view embraces the principle of mutuality. In what 
follows, however, we shall argue that that view encompasses an overly restrictive, essentially 
static account of the relationship between context-specific coping and background coping, an 
account that supports a relation of one-way dependence, but not one of dynamic co-
dependence. But if that is right, then the possibility that there exist ground-level representations 
is back on the agenda. The challenge would then be to show that there are situations which are 
consistent with – or perhaps, to raise the bar further, suggested by – the principle of mutuality, 
in which the presence of ground-level representations is not merely possible, but to be 
expected. We think that this challenge too can be met, and in its more demanding form. 
 
To put us on the right road, here is an opening thought. From a Heideggerian 
phenomenological perspective, there is every reason to think that there exists a mode of 
context-specific coping that is representational in form. The key here is a way of encountering 
entities that Heidegger (1996) calls un-readiness-to-hand. This is in contrast with readiness-to-
hand (the transparency of equipmental entities in hitch-free use which is correlated with 
nonrepresentational absorbed coping) and presence-at-hand (the explicit consciousness of 
entities as full-blown objects which is correlated with the kind of fully representational, 
decontextualized reasoning prioritized by the cognitivist picture). Un-readiness-to-hand emerges 
paradigmatically when skilled practical activity is disturbed by broken or malfunctioning 
equipment, discovered-to-be-missing equipment, or in-the-way equipment, although, as 
Cappuccio and Wheeler (2010) have stressed, un-readiness-to-hand does not need to be the 
result of some actual disturbance to a pre-existing flow of absorbed coping, but may be 
established by an attitude on the part of the agent. When encountered as un-ready-to-hand, 
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entities typically solicit the agent to temporarily monitor and plan his actions, in order to solve 
context-specific practical problems posed by the environment. For instance, if I am on the way 
to work, a broken watch is encountered by me not as a lump of metal of measurable mass (that 
is, as a present-at-hand object removed from the range of my practical concerns), but as a 
faulty timekeeper, a damaged tool that constitutes a hindrance to my train-catching activity. It 
thus solicits certain remedial, context-dependent, problem-solving actions (for example, the use 
of alternative time-keeping resources, planning a visit to a watchmaker). 
 
Heidegger‟s analysis suggests further that the kind of practical problem solving 
distinctive of un-readiness-to-hand involves representational states (Wheeler, 2005, 2008, 
2010). Crucially, however, these are not the full-blooded cognitivist representations that 
plausibly mediate epistemic access to the present-at-hand. When revealed as present-at-hand, 
an entity will be experienced in terms of properties that are action-neutral, specifiable without 
essential reference to the representing agent, and context-independent. By contrast, when 
revealed as un-ready-to-hand, an entity will be represented in terms of properties that are 
action-specific, egocentric and dependent on a particular context of activity.    So, for example, 
the online, task-engaged navigator may represent the external environment by way of an 
egocentrically defined space in which obstacles appear only as regions to be avoided, 
positioned in terms of roughly specified bearings relative to her own body. The character of the 
kinds of representations distinctive of un-readiness-to-hand is an issue to which we shall return. 
For the moment, the key point is that, although practical problem solving in the domain of the 
un-ready-to-hand is not absorbed coping (by hypothesis, absorbed coping has been disturbed), 
it nevertheless remains a form of context-specific coping (since it is paradigmatically a skilled 
adaptive process oriented towards re-establishing a dynamical balance with a specific extant 
situation). From now on, then, we shall use the term skilled coping as an overarching term 
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covering both forms of context-specific coping. Using this terminology, the point on the table 
right now is that skilled coping may come in nonrepresentational and representational forms. 
 
Perhaps surprisingly, Dreyfus agrees that, in cases of un-readiness-to-hand, skilled 
coping within specific contexts occurs in a representational modality. He argues, however, that 
“all coping, including unready-to-hand coping, takes place on the background of [a] basic 
nonrepresentational, holistic, absorbed, kind of intentionality, which Heidegger calls being-in-
the-world” (Dreyfus 2008, 345-6). In other words, skilled coping, whether representational or 
not, is derivative on background coping, which, by Dreyfusian lights, is necessarily 
nonrepresentational. Thus although representations may figure in certain forms of intelligent 
behaviour within the more fundamental condition of thrownness (that is, provided that 
background coping is already in place), they cannot figure in the ground-level process of 
background coping itself. On this model, then, the dependency relation between background 
coping and skilled coping is unidirectional and bottom-up. And that‟s why the Dreyfusian model, 
as built on by Rietveld, ultimately falls short of being a satisfying account of the background. Its 
commitment to a one-way dependency relation between skilled coping and background coping 
collides head-on with the Merleau-Pontian prerequisite of a strict dynamic co-constitution 
between an action and its background; in other words, it flouts the principle of mutuality. 
 
So now what happens if we wholeheartedly pursue a model in which background coping 
and skilled coping are genuinely and dynamically co-dependent? To set the scene, let‟s return 
once more to our opening example. It is true both that George VI was coping with his 
background when he forced himself to give his speech on the national radio, and that his oration 
constituted an instance of skilled coping directed at producing a certain performance. Now, on 
the nonrepresentational account of ground-level intelligence, some aspects of this story remain 
decidedly unexplained. What really did push King George VI to give his speech, in spite of his 
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debilitating stutter, taking on an institutional duty that intimidated him and that his brother had 
declined not long before? It seems difficult to claim that his decision to confront the local context 
of that public announcement was fluidly coupled with, and unproblematically derived from his 
personal and political history (and thus from his background coping), as the emotional tone of 
the situation seemed strongly to discourage that decision; so much so, in fact, that even his 
personal identity and institutional function, and not just the contingent circumstances of the 
speech, could be seen as an anguishing state of affairs to be avoided (more on Angst below). 
After all, George had always thought of himself as a marine officer, and was totally unprepared 
to be crowned until a few weeks earlier. We can infer from this that neither the King‟s existential 
background nor the local context of his action established preconditions or affordances that 
positively summoned or solicited him to accomplish his duty. In truth, both the global 
background and the local context hindered his action so strongly that he had to suspend his 
direct coupling with them, and actively create a more favourable context into which to transfer 
his performance. This shift could be achieved only through a resolute effort on the part of the 
King to become aware of, and to change, the conditions of his contextual situation, and not 
through a process in which he unreflectively accommodated himself to those conditions. Hence 
the disclosive and transformative function of the King‟s embodied preparatory routines, his 
furiously repeated tongue twisters. Some skilled embodied practices (like preparatory gestures), 
then, don‟t merely achieve an appropriate response to the actual contextual opportunities of 
action, but rather address the context itself as a problem, in order to reconfigure it and to 
disclose new opportunities for action. 
   
This capacity to reconfigure the background, in order to achieve local context-creation, is 
an idea that bubbles away tantalizingly, alongside Dreyfusian summoning, in Sutton‟s (2007) 
compelling recent analysis of expert batting in cricket. Sutton observes that certain 
“individualized „pre-ball routines‟ as the batsman prepares and takes guard act […] as a 
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transportable sequence of consistent and comfortable signs which prepare the mindful body for 
action” (p. 774; more later on this crucial idea of embodied routines as signs). These 
preparatory embodied routines are then linked, in a way that is suggestive of context-creation, 
to the ability of expert batsmen to reset their response profiles at key moments in the game.  
 
When the match situation is changing rapidly and continually – over the crucial 
dying overs of a decisive one-day game, for example – good players will be constantly 
resetting their response repertoire in ways which may have been discussed or partly 
planned out in advance, either deliberately or simply as the result of the sedimented history 
of relevant experience. This doesn‟t mean deciding in advance that only one stroke is 
allowable “no matter what,” but rather altering the probabilities of attempting certain shots to 
certain ranges of possible deliveries […] One successful case was when, during the one-
day internationals before the 2005 Ashes series, Andrew Strauss set himself more than 
once to get way across to the offside, outside the line of good-length balls from Jason 
Gillespie and use the pace to lift them over fine leg, a shot unthinkable in less audacious 
circumstances. (Sutton, 2007, p.775) 
 
At this point a clarification (or perhaps a complication) is in order. Although further 
analysis is required, it is arguable that our examples of preparatory embodied routines do not 
reward the kind of „voluntaristic‟ interpretation that one might naturally find most tempting. 
Indeed, in our view, there is reason to be suspicious of any claim that the reconfiguration of King 
George VI‟s background was the outcome of an absolutely free choice on his part, a choice in 
which he employed some sort of latent „inner power‟ against the external circumstances. 
Heidegger (1996, p. 176) warns us that to interpret the phenomena of resoluteness and 
deliberation in these sorts of voluntaristic terms would be to miss the fundamental fact that there 
cannot be any decision that is not always already decided by its background preconditions. This 
Heideggerian principle, it seems, should apply to those decisions that concern the background 
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itself. After all, one might see King George VI‟s transformation of his predicament as itself 
situated within an acceptance of certain broader circumstances, meaning that the decision to 
deploy specific preparatory embodied routines was the only possibility disclosed to the King at 
that time, the only thing he could do to respond to the dramatic call of the situation. So decisions 
cannot be abstracted from their background altogether. Nevertheless, that doesn‟t alter the fact 
that some decisions must be taken, those that serve to abstract the agent‟s behaviour away 
from certain extant configurations of the background while producing new specific 
configurations. As we have seen, the King‟s speech simply couldn‟t have been delivered, if he 
hadn‟t used his preparatory embodied routines to gather his resolute decision, in part as a way 
of ignoring those context-specific solicitations that would have positively hindered his skilled 
performance. 
 
Preparatory embodied routines enable a special kind of context-switching in which an 
appropriate set of action-soliciting conditions is called forth actively by those very routines. 
Context-switching is here not a response to shifting environmental circumstances, but an agent-
driven intelligent strategy for adaptively structuring behaviour. Our proposal is that the 
functioning of such routines needs to be understood as one which is representational in form. 
An immediate reason for thinking that representational language is appropriate here draws on 
our earlier Heideggerian claim that un-readiness-to-hand (the disruption of absorbed coping) 
ushers in a representational mode of agent-environment engagement, because it opens up a 
problem-solving cognitive distance between agent and environment. It seems that preparatory 
embodied routines assume the same kind of problem-solving cognitive distance between agent 
and environment as is operative in the domain of un-readiness-to-hand, suggesting an 
extension of the representation-involving explanatory template from the latter to the former. 
Turning this suggestive analogy into a compelling explanatory perspective requires some 




4. Signs as Action-Oriented Representations 
There are situations in which intelligent behaviour requires us to deal with the whole 
context of our current coping activity. This happens when we need to recall the whole network of 
practical preconditions that define our present possibilities of action, possibly to contrast them 
with other, non-actual possibilities that are connected to them. In Heidegger‟s phenomenological 
analysis, this experience is initiated by Signs. 
 
In the theoretical sense that matters here, the class of Signs is not limited to graphic 
signs or conventional means of communication, but potentially includes any situational element 
(event, state, process, thing …). When revealed as Signs, situational elements make us aware 
of our context and delineate its normative boundaries. A “sign is something ontically ready-to-
hand which is not just this particular equipment, but functions as something that indicates the 
ontological structure of readiness-to-hand, referral-totality and worldhood” (Heidegger, 1996, p. 
82). Any situational element can become a Sign, just as soon as it emerges out of the 
background of our skilled coping activity and starts to orient our attention towards those 
background conditions themselves. For example, malfunctioning or unfamiliar pieces of 
equipment are likely to become Signs of the problematic situation in which they show up, 
introducing un-ready-to-hand interactions. Thus a road sign informing the skilled driver of a 
detour announces that her absorbed coping with the road is interrupted, and indicates that she 
must withdraw from her current activity of automatic driving, possibly switching to an alternative, 
reflective modality of driving, in order to follow or find an alternative route home. For a stuttering 
orator who is on the threshold of giving an important speech, the smallest hesitation in 
pronouncing a single syllable may become a Sign of his challenging situation. As a Sign, his 
hesitation reminds him that his oratorical task is risky, that he must focus carefully on the 
training received, that he cannot fail for the sake of his personal, familial, and institutional duties. 
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This attention combines with a sudden awareness of many preconditions (about his present 
situation, past training, future historical consequences) that were buried in the background of his 
oratorical activity until the instant that he hesitated on that syllable. Even when coping proceeds 
smoothly, ready-to-hand pieces of equipment may morph into Signs, disclosing to our attention 
that the whole context of action, rather than just this or that piece of equipment, matters to us 
and constrains our conduct. Thus a delicious smell coming from the oven is a Sign reminding us 
of our current activity of cooking and making us aware that it is time either to check the progress 
of our almost baked cake or to switch to the context of preparing the table for dinner. Signs thus 
operate in ready-to-hand and to un-ready-to-hand scenarios. The main difference is that while, 
in the former kind of scenario, Signs create the possibility of reflecting on one‟s absorbed coping 
(including the possibility of disrupting that coping) as a successful outcome of the coping 
process itself, in the latter kind of scenario, in which an interruption to absorbed coping has 
already happened, Signs more directly establish the shape of the appropriate reflective 
response.  
 
So, by standing out from their inconspicuous surroundings, Signs call the skilled agent to 
pay attention to the circumstances, the preconditions, and the goals of her activity. So 
conceived, Signs often allow us to adjust our behaviour to the present context of action. Equally, 
however, because of that same signs standing-out, background-disclosing function, Signs may 
provide the instigating means by which adaptive context-switching – whether reactive or 
proactive in nature – may occur. It is at this point that it becomes illuminating to conceptualize 
preparatory embodied routines – routines whose function is precisely to reconfigure the 
background, in order to transform the context for action – as a special sub-class of Signs. This 
Heideggerian gloss, we think, allows us to appreciate the full scope and importance of Sutton‟s 
(2007, p.774) cricket-related remark that “individualized „pre-ball routines‟ as the batsman 
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prepares and takes guard act […] as a transportable sequence of consistent and comfortable 
signs which prepare the mindful body for action” (emphasis added). 
 
The next piece in the theoretical jigsaw we are building is to conceptualize Signs, and 
thus preparatory embodied routines, as representations. What this would establish is that, 
contra Dreyfus, context-switching may be enabled and driven by representational structures. Of 
course, Dreyfus holds that representations cannot solve the problem of relevance. Indeed, he 
goes further, by suggesting that, from a Heideggerian phenomenological perspective, the 
problem of relevance is revealed, at least partly, to be an artefact of representationalism. As he 
puts it, „for Heidegger, all representational accounts are part of the problem‟ (Dreyfus 2008, p. 
358). If Dreyfus is right, our attempt here to interpret the relevance-sensitive structures that are 
Signs, and thus to interpret preparatory embodied routines, in representational terms is doomed 
to failure. But is it right? To resist Dreyfus‟s antirepresentational scepticism, we need to remind 
ourselves that representations come in more than one conceptual flavour. As we have seen, in 
the fully decontextualized mode of presence-at-hand, representations in experience will encode 
properties that are essentially action-neutral, specifiable without any necessary reference to the 
representing agent, and context-independent. A map in a Cartesian co-ordinate system would 
be an example of a present-at-hand representation. In the mode of un-readiness-to-hand, 
however, entities will be represented in experience in terms of properties that are action-
specific, egocentric and intrinsically embedded in a particular context of activity. 
Representations with this profile have been dubbed action-oriented representations (henceforth 
AORs; for further discussion, see for instance Wheeler 2005). 
 
It will be useful to deepen our appreciation of the nature of AORs, by investigating the 
subpersonal, mechanistic counterparts of the phenomenologically identified cases on which we 
have concentrated so far. A seminal example of subpersonal AORs is provided by Mataric‟s 
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sonar-driven mobile robot Toto (Mataric, 1991). Toto wanders around its office environment 
following walls and avoiding obstacles. As it proceeds it constructs an internal map encoded in 
terms of patterns of sensorimotor activity. For example, if Toto keeps detecting proximally 
located objects on its right hand side, while its compass bearing remains unchanged, then a 
„right-wall‟ is encoded in the subagential map, not as some objective entity, but in terms of the 
robot‟s sensorimotor „experience‟ at the time. These structured sensorimotor „experiences‟ 
(Toto‟s landmarks) are stored as connected nodes in a distributed graph, and this record of the 
robot‟s own sensorimotor history constitutes its subpersonal map of the spatial environment. 
Toto is then able to navigate its way around using paths encoded as sequences of past, current, 
and expected sensorimotor „experiences‟. 
 
Toto‟s maps thus exhibit the range of inter-related properties that were previously 
disclosed by a phenomenological analysis of un-readiness-to-hand, and which are distinctive of 
AORs. They are action-specific, in that they are tailored to the job of producing the specific 
behaviour required. They are egocentric, in that they encode the environment in terms of the 
robot‟s own history of sensorimotor „experiences‟. And they are intrinsically context-dependent, 
in that because those maps are embedded in the kind of domain-dependent, task-specific 
mechanisms that we earlier identified as SPACs (meaning that they wouldn‟t be any good for 
working out things like the objective distance to the snack bar), Toto never confronts the 
problem of selecting, out of a vast sea of potentially available spatial information that could have 
been retrieved and internally stored, the subset of such data relevant to the navigational context 
in which it operates. Another way of explicating this final property is as the reason why Toto 
never confronts the frame problem, a reason which turns directly on the conceptual profile of 




As a result of the operative profile just described, AORs are what might be called 
minimally representational in character. Rather than determinately specifying some detailed 
objective content (knowledge-that), AORs indicate an open-ended set of possible actions (a 
kind of under-specified knowledge-how), just like the detour sign that vaguely suggests the 
many directions that, given one‟s practical knowledge, one might take to drive home. Mention of 
the detour sign suggests a crucial observation. If we permit ourselves to interpret egocentricity 
more generally as a kind of perspectival deictic indication, Signs may be counted as AORs. As 
AORs, Signs indicate the different possibilities of coping that essentially define the current 
context or, via the background, a range of potentially associated contexts. Signs are not 
present-at-hand representations, because their referential function is not action-neutral or 
context-independent. Rather, their function is essentially action-orienting and context-specific, 
warning us that something must be done in a certain situation (for example, „take the detour‟). 
Given their minimally representational status, however, the precise form of this „something that 
must be done‟ will be determined in detail by the trajectory of our competent engagement in the 
world.  
 
A Sign, understood as an AOR, will determine a standpoint that is disclosed from within 
the background, but from which we relate to that background, allowing us to redirect our 
attention to access different depths or levels of coping, and thereby alter the relevance of 
various action-shaping preconditions. At any moment, some background conditions will matter 
more than others, and Signs move us from one perspectival angle to another, actively 
transforming the potential availability of different contexts of actions, and not merely the 
potential availability of alternative actions within the same context. Tongue twisters and other 
preparatory rituals are thus best interpreted as Signs that a performer, under the pressure of 
unfamiliar or problematic contingencies, deploys as a useful scaffold to change his dispositions 
towards the immediate contingencies, not only to better recognize the available affordances (he 
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is already trained and ready to deal with the physical environment), but to establish a more 
appropriate perspective of self-interpretation in the light of a different configuration of his 
background. To see the environment as a familiar scenario for our actions requires recognizing 
it as compatible with certain background motivations, expectations and intentions that Signs 
prioritize in place of others that are debilitating or disruptive. We have seen that preparatory 
embodied routines, like Signs in general, enable us to manipulate the background preconditions 
and criteria that determine relevance, from within the current context. And since Signs are 
AORs, we can conclude that our capacity to navigate the background – our ground-level 
intelligence – is sometimes contingent upon the availability of minimal representations and is 
actively shaped by those structures. 
 
The role that we have found for ground-level minimal representations might seem to 
contravene the principle of unity. The principle of unity would indeed be violated if the position 
we have sketched required the background to be divisible into encapsulated components, but 
the fact that the background can be articulated in different ways (that is, the fact that we can 
distinguish different modes or configurations of the global preconditions of one‟s situated sense 
of reality) doesn‟t imply encapsulation in any strict sense. If some forms of representation can in 
truth produce articulation without encapsulation, they will remain consistent with the holistic 
unity of the background. Our account keeps intact the unity of the background, by combining it 
with the idea that the background is accessed and manipulated perspectivally, from distinct 
angles. Each of these angles indicates a certain global reconfiguration of the totality of the 
background, which is however never exhaustively represented by any of these indications. 
Indeed, if a part or portion of the background, configured in representational form, attempted to 
encode the totality of the background, this would lead to an infinite regress (like an encyclopedia 
containing itself and its full description); but this regress is never established, if we assume that 
a local representational configuration of the background provides only an indication of some 
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possible way of accessing the totality of the background (like an encyclopedia containing the 
index of its own chapters and contents). AORs (including Signs and thus preparatory embodied 
routines) indicate how to inhabit the background strategically; they do not attempt to build a 
complete model of the background. If this is right, and if such representation-driven strategic 
inhabitings provide the basis for events such as fluid context-switching, then minimally 
representational processes are indeed at the heart of the ground-level intelligence. 
 
5. ‘Angst’ and the Problem of Relevance 
As we have seen, Signs ordinarily prompt an agent to stand before this or that context of 
action. However, a particular experience that Heidegger calls „Angst’ allows an agent to stand 
apart from the totality of all the possible contexts in which she can act, intuiting the extreme 
edge that globally delimits her possibilities as a thrown individual. “Angst provides the 
phenomenal basis for explicitly grasping the primordial totality of being of Da-sein” (Heidegger, 
1996, p. 176). Despite this explicit grasping of the totality of what is intelligible, Angst remains a 
phenomenon that occurs to situated agents within the world, not as a de-worlded „view-from-
nowhere‟, but as an immanent mode of attunement within the world that discloses the world as 
world. Intriguingly, a link may be forged between Angst and the problem of relevance.  
 
To bring this link into view, we can begin by noting that although Angst can be 
announced by Signs, Signs cannot actually indicate the object or objects of Angst. That is 
because Angst has no object, or at least no definite one. Imagine that, while the preoccupied 
George VI is preparing himself to give a speech, he glimpses the austere gaze of an ancestor in 
an old painting, or sees a blinking light on the microphone watching him like a malevolent red 
eye, or hears his own voice hesitating on a certain syllable. These Signs, harmless in 
themselves, may disrupt his attention and fill his heart with vague senses of discomfort, 
apprehension and finally anxiety. The possibility of a complete failure looms, a possibility that 
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shakes his confidence in his social skills, his political determination, and his historical mission. 
What this example indicates is that, in certain situations, even the most innocuous Signs can 
unearth such profound layers of the background, that the agent is shaken by deeper and deeper 
degrees of uncertainty. This uncertainty impairs, rather than facilitates, his capability to 
recommence a fluid process of coping. In this spiral of growing anxiety, not only the agent‟s 
acquaintance with this or that situation, but his whole sense of reality, his sense of being-in-the-
world, is eventually challenged by questions such as: „why am I here?‟, „what is the real 
meaning of my actions?‟, „what am I supposed to do now?‟, and so on. Manifested by a feeling 
of uncanniness, Angst doesn‟t have a precise object but expresses a wrenching of the agent 
from her meaning-giving background. Heidegger (1996, p.175) describes this phenomenon as a 
“not-being-at-home”, the disorienting experience of being confronted by a meaningless world 
that appears alien and unintelligible. 
 
Through Angst we encounter the fact that all the possible ways things usually matter to 
us depend on our situated perspectives in thrownness. But since it is in thrownness itself that is 
exposed by Angst, all our absorbed coping activities are revealed as devoid of intrinsic 
meaning. Those coping activities are now being observed from the perspective of our 
fundamentally precarious, ultimately ungrounded existential situation. As a consequence, even 
if all our competences are still in place, our ability to use them stops mattering to us. Our skilled 
coping becomes the “merely occurrent” (Heidegger, 1996, p.103) object of an anxious 
contemplation that disconnects affordances from the responses that they habitually summon in 
us. Thus “the totality of relevance discovered within the world of things at hand and objectively 
present is completely without importance. It collapses. The world has the character of complete 




Crucially, the „knowledge‟ gained through Angst never amounts in itself to a complete, 
fully-representational depiction of the background. Rather, the alienation that Angst introduces 
engages a restless interrogation on the part of the agent regarding the meaning of things. The 
questions that he poses to himself about this meaning cannot find a theoretical answer, 
because any such answer would presuppose the world that Angst had made meaningless. So, 
even if that question originates fundamentally from the background of that meaning, the very 
fact that the question is formulated in Angst makes the meaning of the background 
indiscernible. Although it is clear that the knowledge of the background revealed by Angst is not 
fully-representational, it seems plausible that it must be at least minimally representational, as it 
clearly produces a modulation of the background by adopting an explicit perspective within the 
background, assuming the dynamic co-molding of cognitive distance and skilled action that is 
typical of AORs and the kind of troubled coping regime that may be introduced by Signs, 
although this attunement with the background is of a very strange, uncanny nature. Crucially, for 
Heidegger, the minimally representational phenomenon of Angst precedes – ontologically, if not 
chronologically – even the possibilities of our skilled coping. As he puts it: “Tranquillized, familiar 
being-in-the-world is a mode of the uncanniness of Da-sein, not the other way around. Not-
being-at-home must be conceived existentially and ontologically as the more primordial 
phenomenon. And only because Angst always already latently determines being-in-the-world, 
can being-in-the-world” (p. 177). 
 
Conceived as a fundamental structure of human life, Angst provides a new perspective 
on the frame problem. Structurally destined to care, and constitutively exposed to the possibility 
of the total loss of meaning through Angst, human beings seem realistically open to something 
tantalizingly close in form to the inter-context frame problem that affects cognitivist AI. Seduced 
by the dreadful Signs that lead her to withdraw from her context, the agent experiences a more 
and more dramatic loss of the sense of mattering, a loss that paralyzes her responsiveness to 
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the circumstances and make her aware of the necessity to deliberate, even if no stable 
foundation for deliberation is available. The endless series of questions that the agent is driven 
to ask about her own being, as she endeavours to delineate contextual meaning (what matters) 
is analogous to the infinite regress of meaning-targeting structures that are indicative of the 
frame problem. The difference is that, in the case of humans, the Angst driven „frame problem‟ 
derives from a contingent suspension of the holistic coupling with the background that usually 
gives meaning to our actions, while for cognitivist AI systems this holistic direct coupling is 
structurally missing due to the system‟s lack of thrownness (see above). And that is why, when 
the human agent forgets about the network of endless open questions in which it is trapped in 
Angst, it buries the fundamental sense of uncanniness under its habitual commerce with worldly 
things, and becomes „tranquillized‟: it can then go back to its skilled coping with the world, re-
activating its background coping, a possibility that is fundamentally unavailable to machines that 
lack thrownness. 
 
6. Utilization Behaviour Revisited 
As a bonus to the main business of this paper, our analysis of ground-level intelligence 
has left us in a position to counter Rietveld‟s arguments against the distinction between intra-
context and inter-context sensitivity to relevance. In particular, as far as we can tell, the 
phenomenon of utilization behaviour doesn‟t undermine this distinction, but rather demonstrates 
that the human capacity to produce appropriate actions is severely disrupted when the 
boundary in question collapses, allowing any local solicitation to acquire the role of a global 
precondition. The patient exhibiting utilization behaviour has not lost his sensitivity to the holistic 
meaning of his actions (he has a background, and he is still a thrown agent, in Heidegger‟s 
sense); the problem is that this meaning is now totally absorbed by the contingent situation. He 
can still perfectly cope with beds to be made, and this means that he knows the normative 
preconditions of this action, but he can‟t separate the contingent contextual solicitations from the 
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holistic consideration of the whole situation, as if the bed was the totality of the world with which 
he must deal. 
 
Normally, the background of our actions is not given to us as an all-encompassing and 
all-determining universal structure, but is articulated perspectivally within the local contexts in 
which it may be involved. Just as the veins in a not-yet-sculpted piece of marble suggested to 
Michelangelo the forms to be carved out from it, Signs delineate the different contextual 
articulations that a situated agent will produce by addressing pragmatically (that is, with a 
specific purpose in her mind) the unitary structure of her background. Indeed, Signs testify that 
the distinction between different contexts of action, as well as the very distinction between local 
contexts and the holistic background, is ontologically grounded, even though it is virtual 
(embedded in possibility). The appearance of Signs delineates the phenomenological 
boundaries separating different contexts of action, revealing whether or not it is possible to 
switch between them by adopting different perspectives for accessing the background. In cases 
where Signs announce a relevant transition between contexts, it means that genuine ontological 
boundaries exist within the background. 
 
Things are very different for patients exhibiting utilization behaviour. For them, the 
background is entirely explicated by the actual focus of interest, such that no other contexts are 
possible. The dissolution of the separation between different contexts of action is demonstrated 
by the fact that the patient fails to experience the Signs that usually warn us to monitor our 
actions as soon as we cross the borders of appropriateness. The patient fails to interpret the 
surprised face of his host as a sign that his actions are not appropriate in her house, because 
the relevant contextual borders no longer exist for him. Such borders clearly exist in normal 
experience, which is why we immediately respond to the presence of Duchamp‟s famous 
fountain in a museum as out-of-context. From the twentieth century, the fine arts systematically 
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employed the alienating experience of out-of-context objects and events in order to produce, in 
observers, an active reflection on the background preconditions of their own notion of a work of 
art. This reflection couldn‟t be achieved if the observers in question were not comparing the 
global background of the broader situation with the local factive circumstances in which it is 
perspectivally disclosed. Signs help us to understand when we need to switch from one context 
to another to continue producing appropriate behaviour. But they also tell us when our actions 
are crossing contextual borders into a territory of the non-appropriateness. 
 
What now of Rietveld‟s neurofunctional argument? Rietveld‟s overall position requires 
(on the philosophical level) that (1) sensitivity to background conditions is never informed by 
context-specific competences, and (on the neurofunctional level) that (2) sensitivity to 
background conditions is underpinned by brain mechanisms that globally tune the sensory 
systems, a process which is necessary for goal-specific motor structures (dedicated to both 
action execution and the understanding of affordances) to underpin context-specific 
competences. This picture, according to Rietveld, is confirmed by the evidence that (3) the 
tuning of the sensory system in accordance with the agent‟s contextual expectations determines 
the conditions under which the contributions of context-specific motor competences are 
relevant. While we agree with (2), we have already argued that (1) represents both an 
inappropriately static model of the relation between background coping and skilled coping, and 
a transgression of the principle of mutuality. If background coping is a unitary process, then 
access to it is always perspectivally oriented in accordance with the way the agent engages her 
local context, such that different context-specific competences can determine some of the 
background preconditions. For example, according to the premotor theory of attention (Rizzolatti 
and Craighero, 2010), the same frontal-parietal circuits that control ocular movements towards 
specific spatial locations actively reconfigure the attention towards the same locations in order 
to prime the detection of salient elements (Rizzolatti et al., 1987). In an analogous way, the 
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experimental data on canonical neurons show that the same pre-motor circuits that control the 
execution of certain goal-specific transitive actions are recruited by the process of detection and 
recognition of the objects that afford those actions (Rizzolatti and Luppino, 2001). These 
findings suggest that spatial attention and detection of the environmental features related to the 
relevant context of action do not result from a dedicated control mechanism, but from the same 
mechanisms (corresponding to SPACs, in our hypothesis) that control the execution of the 
appropriate actions in those contexts: “as in the case of spatial attention eye movement 
preparation selects a given spatial location, the preparation of a grasping movement selects an 
object with specific intrinsic characteristics” (Rizzolatti and Craighero, 2010). But that means 
that (3) tells only one half of the neurofunctional story, because, in accordance with the principle 
of mutuality, the medial system that tunes our capability to pick up and interpret relevant 
sensory stimuli can be tuned by our motor engagement with the local context with which we are 
interacting. 
 
Conclusions: the King’s Intelligence 
The conclusions of our analysis may be expressed as a tri-dimensional pattern of 
agreement and disagreement with the account of ground-level intelligence that may be 
extracted from the work of Dreyfus and Rietveld. 
 
First, we agree that the background is inhabited as a unitary set of holistic conditions, but 
this doesn‟t mean that the whole network of background preconditions is always equally 
involved in every kind of coping, because, for each form of skilled coping, some elements or 
modality of background coping may exclude others. The background is a vast web of 
significance that implicitly underpins the mattering of things during coping, but it is a structure 
that we always inhabit from a situated perspective, and different profiles of the background 
matter in different degrees at different times. Were background knowledge always equally 
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present in all its aspects, there would be no need for the disclosive function of Signs, structures 
that highlight the background preconditions that are most relevant in the current situation or that 
may potentially provide a bridge to other contexts of action. 
  
Secondly, we agree that skilled coping, whether absorbed or minimally representational, 
is always underpinned by background coping, but, on the basis of the principle of mutuality, we 
recognize that the background can in turn be modified by ongoing, concrete acts of skilled 
coping. The background provides an ontological platform for our situated experience, but not as 
an immobile ground providing an ultimate, self-sufficient, autonomous foundation, like the set of 
basic axioms for a formal system of first-order logic. Rather, the background is a relatively 
stable scaffold that orients our everyday engagements within the world. Skilled coping 
continuously re-founds the background by dynamically modifying the normative preconditions it 
embodies, but that in turn provides the normative preconditions for further skilled coping. If it is 
correct to conceptualize the background as foundational at all, then, as Heidegger argues, it 
should be characterized as a bottomless abyss of preconditions, each of which requires others, 
according to the general schema of the hermeneutic circle. 
  
Finally, we agree that background coping is not guided by full-blooded representations of 
a traditional kind, because the background can‟t be reduced to a body (however vast) of 
explicitly represented information, beliefs, or stored heuristics. That said, we have argued that 
our access to the background is often mediated and articulated by action-oriented 
representations, sometimes appearing in our experience as Signs. This means that, in the „right‟ 
circumstances, the production of the wrong syllable by a stuttering speaker or an unexpected 
road sign appearing in front of the driver can prompt a global reconfiguration of the background. 
So, in the end, it is a minimally representationalist approach to intelligence that brings the 
background and its dynamics into proper view. The problem of relevance indicates that 
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background coping cannot be understood on the cognitivist model, as a rational process of 
deliberation using full-blooded representations. But, as we have argued, neither can background 
coping be understood, or at least not exhaustively so, on a Dreyfusian model, as the 
unreflective and nonrepresentational selection of past contexts. In other words, at ground-level, 
the King‟s intelligence, like yours and like ours, is in part a matter of negotiating the dynamics of 
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